from the District Court of Campbell County The Honorable
Thomas W. Rumpke, Judge.
Stephen H. Kline of Kline McCorkle, Cheyenne, Wyoming.
G. Hibbler, Bill G. Hibbler, P.C., Special Assistant Attorney
General, Cheyenne, Wyoming.
DAVIS, C.J., and FOX, KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, and GRAY, JJ.
Following an investigation and hearing, the Wyoming Board of
Medicine (Board) suspended Dr. Rebecca Painter's
physician's license for a minimum of five years, fined
her $15, 000, and ordered her to pay one-half of the costs of
the proceedings. Dr. Painter filed a petition for review with
the district court, which affirmed in part, reversed in part,
and reversed and remanded in part the Board's decision.
Dr. Painter appealed from the district court's order and
the Board filed a cross-appeal. Because we conclude the
district court's order is not an "appealable
order" under Rule 1.05 of the Wyoming Rules of Appellate
Procedure (W.R.A.P.), we dismiss these appeals for want of
The parties raise multiple issues but only one is
determinative: Is the district court's order an
"appealable order" under W.R.A.P. 1.05?
The facts of this case are convoluted but, for our purposes,
only a brief summary of the facts as found by the Board is
In 2007, Dr. Painter became Patient's primary care
physician. At that time, Patient was 77 years old, had
decreased mobility, suffered from congestive heart failure,
headaches and dizziness, and was unable to manage her money,
assets, or property without assistance. Over the next eight
years, until Patient's death in January 2015, Dr.
Painter, while still serving as Patient's primary care
physician, became intimately involved in Patient's
personal and financial affairs. Among other things, Dr.
Painter took Patient to lunch, had her over for dinner and to
spend the night, invited Patient to attend her church and to
spend holidays with Dr. Painter and her family, and called
Patient "her little friend." Dr. Painter became
Patient's attorney in fact pursuant to a general durable
power of attorney and a durable power of attorney for health
care. She was named co-trustee of Patient's revocable
trust, personal representative of Patient's estate, and a
joint owner of Patient's bank accounts. Dr. Painter
charged Patient $60 an hour for "financial management
services" and paid herself approximately $42, 725 from
Patient's bank accounts for these services; this amount
included a $35, 000 payment after Patient's death.
Patient's niece complained about Dr. Painter to the
Board. Following a six-day contested hearing, the Board
concluded Dr. Painter's relationship with Patient, as
well as her conduct toward Patient's relatives,
constituted violations of various provisions of the Medical
Practice Act, Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 33-26-101 through
703 (LexisNexis 2019), and the Board's administrative
rules. The Board suspended Dr. Painter's medical license
for a minimum of five years, imposed a $15, 000 fine, and
ordered her to pay one-half of the costs of the proceedings,
including attorney fees and hearing examiner expenses.
Dr. Painter filed a petition for review with the district
court. The court affirmed the Board's decision that Dr.
Painter had exploited Patient under §
33-26-402(a)(vii) and had improperly terminated their
physician-patient relationship in violation of §
33-26-402(a)(xxvii)(B), (xxxi), and Chapter 3, § 5 of
the Board's administrative rules. It reversed the
Board's decision that Dr. Painter had exploited
Patient's relatives under § 33-26-402(a)(vii),
concluding "there [was] insufficient evidence that [Dr.
Painter] used undue influence, intimidated, harassed, or
deceived the family members to deprive them of their
property." The district court ruled that Dr.
Painter's exploitation of Patient "cannot create
vicarious liability for exploitation of [Patient's family
members]." It also reversed the Board's conclusion
that Dr. Painter had violated § 33-26-402(a)(xxvii)(C),
(E), (J) and (K) because it determined expert testimony was
necessary to prove a violation of these subsections and the
Board had provided none.
The court reversed and remanded the Board's decision that
Dr. Painter had violated § 33-26-402(x) because it was
unclear whether the Board found Dr. Painter violated any
provision of the Medical Practice Act, including §
33-26-402(a)(vii), or whether it found Dr. Painter had
violated "any other applicable provision of law."
On remand, the court directed the Board to provide "more
detailed findings to explain the basis for discipline under
§ 33-26-402(a)(x)." The court also concluded that
in one section of the Board's decision the Board found
Dr. Painter had violated § 33-26-402(a)(xxvii)(C) while
in another section of the decision it found no such
violation. It reversed and remanded for the Board to address
that inconsistency. The court further found the Board had
failed to address whether Dr. Painter had ...