from the District Court of Laramie County The Honorable
Thomas T.C. Campbell, Judge
Representing Appellant: Office of the State Public Defender:
Diane M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Olson,
Appellate Counsel; Kirk Morgan, Senior Assistant Appellate
Representing Appellee: Peter K. Michael, Attorney General;
Christyne M. Martens, Senior Assistant Attorney General;
Benjamin E. Fischer, Assistant Attorney General.
BURKE, C.J., and HILL, [†] DAVIS, FOX, and KAUTZ,
Appellant, Anthony Lee Heinemann, challenges the district
court's entry of an order nunc pro tunc
correcting two judgments entered against him in 1998. We
Appellant presents five issues:
1. Did the Department of Corrections have standing to seek an
order nunc pro tunc?
2. Did the order nunc pro tunc violate
Appellant's right to due process of law?
3. Is Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-6-108 a statute of repose, and
the only mechanism other than Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-6-106
for reimbursement of public defender fees?
4. Did the State of Wyoming invite the error it now complains
5. Is the State barred by res judicata from pursuing
this issue under the guise of an order nunc pro
In 1998, Appellant received convictions following jury trials
in two related cases. In the first case, Appellant was
convicted of taking indecent liberties with a child, in
violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-3-105(a) (LexisNexis
1999), and furnishing alcohol to a minor, in violation of
Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 12-6-101(a). In the second case,
Appellant was convicted of sexual assault in the third
degree, in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-
304(a)(iii). Because Appellant had previously received a
conviction in Colorado for attempted first-degree sexual
assault, the district court imposed an enhanced sentence of
life imprisonment without parole in the latter case pursuant
to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2- 306(d).
At the joint sentencing hearing, counsel for Appellant asked
the court to find that Appellant was unable to pay his
attorney's fees. The district court declined to do so.
Instead, it stated that it "[would] include in the order
a requirement that [attorney's fees] be paid, although
whether there's any ability to pay at any [time] in the