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Tharpe v. Sellers

United States Supreme Court

January 8, 2018



          Per Curiam.

         Petitioner Keith Tharpe moved to reopen his federal habeas corpus proceedings regarding his claim that the Georgia jury that convicted him of murder included a white juror, Barney Gattie, who was biased against Tharpe because he is black. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 60(b)(6). The District Court denied the motion on the ground that, among other things, Tharpe's claim was procedurally defaulted in state court. The District Court also noted that Tharpe could not overcome that procedural default because he had failed to produce any clear and convincing evidence contradicting the state court's determination that Gattie's presence on the jury did not prejudice him. See Tharpe v. Warden, No. 5:10-cv-433 (MD Ga., Sept. 5, 2017), App. B to Pet. for Cert. 19.

         Tharpe sought a certificate of appealability (COA). The Eleventh Circuit denied his COA application after deciding that jurists of reason could not dispute that the District Court's procedural ruling was correct. See Tharpe v. Warden, 2017 WL 4250413, *3 (Sept. 21, 2017). The Eleventh Circuit's decision, as we read it, was based solely on its conclusion, rooted in the state court's factfinding, that Tharpe had failed to show prejudice in connection with his procedurally defaulted claim, i.e., that Tharpe had "failed to demonstrate that Barney Gattie's behavior 'had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict.' " Ibid, (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637(1993)).

         Our review of the record compels a different conclusion. The state court's prejudice determination rested on its finding that Gattie's vote to impose the death penalty was not based on Tharpe's race. See Thorpe v. Warden, No. 93-cv-144 (Super. Ct. Butts Cty., Ga., Dec. 1, 2008), App. F to Pet. for Cert. 102. And that factual determination is binding on federal courts, including this Court, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. See 28 U.S.C. §2254(e)(1). Here, however, Tharpe produced a sworn affidavit, signed by Gattie, indicating Gattie's view that "there are two types of black people: 1. Black folks and 2. Niggers"; that Tharpe, "who wasn't in the 'good' black folks category in my book, should get the electric chair for what he did"; that "[s]ome of the jurors voted for death because they felt Tharpe should be an example to other blacks who kill blacks, but that wasn't my reason"; and that, "[a]fter studying the Bible, I have wondered if black people even have souls." App. B to Pet. for Cert. 15-16 (internal quotation marks omitted). Gattie's remarkable affidavit-which he never retracted- presents a strong factual basis for the argument that Tharpe's race affected Gattie's vote for a death verdict. At the very least, jurists of reason could debate whether Tharpe has shown by clear and convincing evidence that the state court's factual determination was wrong. The Eleventh Circuit erred when it concluded otherwise.

         The question of prejudice-the ground on which the Eleventh Circuit chose to dispose of Tharpe's application- is not the only question relevant to the broader inquiry whether Tharpe should receive a COA. The District Court denied Tharpe's Rule 60(b) motion on several grounds not addressed by the Eleventh Circuit. We express no view of those issues here. In light of the standard for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(6), which is available only in " 'extraordinary circumstances, ' " Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 536 (2005), Tharpe faces a high bar in showing that jurists of reason could disagree whether the District Court abused its discretion in denying his motion. It may be that, at the end of the day, Tharpe should not receive a COA. And review of the denial of a COA is certainly not limited to grounds expressly addressed by the court whose decision is under review. But on the unusual facts of this case, the Court of Appeals' review should not have rested on the ground that it was indisputable among reasonable jurists that Gattie's service on the jury did not prejudice Tharpe.

         We therefore grant Tharpe's motion to proceed in forma pauperis, grant the petition for certiorari, vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and remand the case for further consideration of the question whether Tharpe is entitled to a COA.

         It is so ordered.

          Justice Thomas, with whom Justice Alito and Justice Gorsuch join, dissenting.

         If bad facts make bad law, then "unusual facts" inspire unusual decisions. Ante, at 3. In its brief per curiam opinion, the Court misreads a lower court's opinion to find an error that is not there, and then refuses to entertain alternative grounds for affirmance. The Court does this to accomplish little more than a do-over in the Court of Appeals: As it concedes, petitioner Keith Tharpe faces a "high bar" on remand to obtain even a certificate of appealability (COA). Ante, at 2.

         One might wonder why the Court engages in this pointless exercise. The only possible explanation is its concern with the "unusual facts" of this case, specifically a juror affidavit that expresses racist opinions about blacks. The opinions in the affidavit are certainly odious. But their odiousness does not excuse us from doing our job correctly, or allow us to pretend that the lower courts have not done theirs.

         The responsibility of courts is to decide cases, both usual and unusual, by neutrally applying the law. The law reflects society's considered judgments about the balance of competing interests, and we must respect those judgments. In bending the rules here to show its concern for a black capital inmate, the Court must think it is showing its concern for racial justice. It is not. Its summary vacatur will not stop Tharpe's execution or erase the "unusual fac[t]" of the affidavit. It will only delay justice for Ja-quelin Freeman, who was also black, who is ignored by the Thomas, J., dissenting majority, and who was murdered by Tharpe 27 years ago. I respectfully dissent.


         The Court's terse opinion tells the reader that this case involves a petitioner, a juror, an affidavit, and a prejudice determination. But it involves much more than that. This case also has a victim, a second affidavit, numerous depositions, factfinding by a state court, and several decisions from federal judges that provide multiple grounds for denying a COA. I will briefly provide this omitted context.


         Keith Tharpe's wife, Migrisus, left him in 1990. Despite a no-contact order, Tharpe called her and told her that if she wanted to "'play dirty'" he would show her "'what dirty was.'" Tharpe v. Warden,834 F.3d 1323, 1325 (CA11 2016). The next morning, Tharpe ambushed his wife and her sister, Jaquelin Freeman, as they drove to work, pulling his truck in front of their car and forcing them to stop. Tharpe aimed a shotgun at the car and ordered his wife to get into his truck. He then told Freeman that he was going to "'f- [her] up'" and took her to the rear of his truck. Ibid. Tharpe shot Freeman, rolled her body into a ditch, reloaded, and shot her again, killing her. After murdering Freeman, Tharpe ...

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