APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.
Hughes, Van Devanter, McReynolds, Brandeis, Sutherland, Butler, Stone, Roberts, Cardozo
MR. JUSTICE ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an appeal from the final decree of a specially constituted district court of three judges for the Southern District of New York denying an interlocutory injunction and dismissing the appellant's bill for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.*fn1 The suit was brought to restrain enforcement of an order issued November 18, 1935, by the Secretary of Commerce pursuant to § 21 of the Shipping Act, 1916,*fn2
requiring the appellant to file with the Secretary on December 16, 1935, a copy or summary of its books and records for the period September 1 to November 12, 1935, which should show each commodity carried from the United States to a foreign country, with point of shipment, point of destination, and rate charged or collected, the effective date of the rate, and trans-shipment and terminal charges and rules affecting rates or value of the service rendered. The order recites that it appears full information as to rates in connection with transportation of certain property from the United States to foreign countries by carriers by water in foreign commerce subject to the Shipping Act 1916 is necessary to the proper administration of the regulatory provisions of the act and that the appellant is engaged in such transportation.
The complaint sets forth five causes of action. The first is that the order is invalid because Congress did not intend by the Legislative Appropriation Act of 1932*fn3 to authorize the President to abolish the Shipping Board and transfer its functions to an executive officer such as the Secretary of Commerce, and that if Congress did so intend the Act is unconstitutional as attempting to make the head of an executive department also a judicial officer
and a legislative officer of the United States and in failing to set up an adequate declaration of policy or standard of action, and, further, that the President promulgated the order of transfer without adequate hearings or findings of fact on which to base it.
The second cause of action is that the Secretary's order is invalid as in substance the attempt of a competitor to regulate or stabilize the appellant's rates and to compel it to charge rates fixed by a shipping monopoly of which appellant's competitor is a member. The charge is that before the order was issued the Secretary had transferred all his Shipping Board functions to one Peacock, who was president of a private shipping corporation (The United States Merchant Fleet Corporation) which was actively operating vessels in competition with those of appellant and was a member of a conference or shipping combination whose interests were opposed to those of appellant, which is an independent or non-conference operator; and that the order had been issued for the financial benefit of the competitor. The further allegation is that the constitutional separation of powers between legislative, judicial, and executive branches and the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution forbid the exercise of regulatory or quasi-judicial functions such as were entrusted to the United States Shipping Board, by persons or agencies having the interests described, and require that the Secretary's order be held for naught.
The third cause of action is that the order was issued not for a public purpose authorized by Congress but in furtherance of a concerted plan to compel the appellant, an independent non-conference carrier, either to join a conference or shipping monopoly, or else suffer damage by disclosure to competitors of current business records showing rates charged and commodities transported. The Secretary's order is alleged to have been issued to promote and foster a monopoly of appellant's competitors.
The fourth cause of action is that the order is an unjust discrimination against appellant which is forbidden by the Fifth Amendment because it requires appellant to file a record of actual transactions, whereas the Secretary requires appellant's competitors, the conference lines or members of the shipping combination, merely to file general rate schedules for the future which are not always observed and need not be observed. Further, that the order issued under § 21 entails penalties for disobedience whereas orders issued by the Secretary to appellant's competitors were not issued under § 21 or any other section of the act, carried no penalties for non-observance, and called only for ...