ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
Fuller, Harlan, Brewer, Brown, Shiras, Jr., White, Peckham, McKenna; Mr. Justice Gray took no part in the decision of this case.
MR. JUSTICE HARLAN delivered the opinion of the court.
The Union Sewer Pipe Company -- a corporation organized under the laws of Ohio and doing business in Illinois -- brought its action against Thomas Connolly, a citizen of Illinois, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of Illinois, on two negotiable promissory notes both executed at Chicago by the defendant; one, dated December 15, 1894, the other dated January 15, 1895, and each payable to the order of the plaintiff corporation ninety days after date at the First National Bank of Chicago.
These notes were given on account of the purchase by the defendant from the plaintiff of sewer pipe commonly known as standard Akron pipe, at prices agreed upon between the parties.
The Pipe Company also brought an action in the same court against William E. Dee, a citizen of Illinois, upon an open account for $2389.26, the value at agreed prices of certain pipe purchased by him from the plaintiff in June 1896. The plaintiff supplied the pipe under a written contract executed between it and the defendant in Illinois under date of August, 1895.
Each of the defendants filed a plea of the general issue, with notice of special defences and of set-off.
The special defences in each case were substantially the same. The notice in the Connolly case was that the defendant on the trial of the action would rely on these special matters:
"First. That the plaintiff is, and at all times since about the first day of January, 1893, has been a trust or combination of the capital, skill and acts of divers persons and corporations carrying on a commercial business in the States of Ohio and Illinois and between said States and elsewhere in the United States of America, and organized for the express purpose of unlawfully and contrary to the common law creating and carrying out restrictions in trade, to wit, in the trade of buying, selling and otherwise dealing in certain articles of merchandise, to wit, sewer and drainage pipes, and also for the express purpose of
unlawfully and contrary to the common law limiting the production of said articles of merchandise and increasing the market price thereof; and also for the express purpose of unlawfully and contrary to the common law preventing competition in the manufacture, making, transportation, sale or purchase of said articles of commerce; also for the express purpose of unlawfully and contrary to the common law fixing standards or figures whereby the prices of said articles of merchandise intended for sale, use and consumption in this State should be controlled and established; and also for the express purpose of unlawfully and contrary to the common law being a pretended agency whereby the sale of said articles of commerce should and might be covered up and made to appear to be for the original vendors thereof, and so as to enable the original vendors or manufacturers thereof to control the wholesale and retail price of such articles of commerce after the title thereto had passed from such vendors or manufacturers; and for the further express purpose of unlawfully and contrary to the common law making and entering into and carrying out a certain contract or certain contracts by which the several persons or corporations forming the plaintiff, or being the pretended stockholders thereof, to wit, have bound themselves not to sell, dispose of or transport said article of commerce below certain common standard figures or card or list prices in excess of the true market values thereof, and by which they have agreed to keep the prices of said articles of commerce at certain fixed or graduated figures, and by which they have established certain settled prices of said articles of commerce between themselves and others, so as to preclude a free and unrestricted competition among themselves and others in the sale and transportation of said articles of commerce, and by which they have agreed to pool, combine and unite any interests they may have in connection with the sale and transportation of said articles of commerce so that the prices thereof may effect advantageously to themselves; that all of the claims of the plaintiff against the defendant in this action arise wholly out of and are in respect of sales of said articles of merchandise made between the 1st day of January, A.D. 1893, and the 1st day of March, 1896, to this defendant by
the plaintiff in the ordinary course of its business as such a trust or combination acting as aforesaid, and that this action is brought to recover the alleged price thereof and for no other purpose.
"Secondly. That the plaintiff is and at all times since the 1st day of January, 1893, was a combination in the form of a trust, in restraint of trade and commerce among the several States, and doing business as such throughout the United States and between the States of Ohio and Illinois, contrary to the provisions of an act of Congress of date of July 2, 1890, and entitled 'An act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies,' and that this action is brought solely to recover the price of articles of merchandise, to wit, sewer and drainage pipes, sold to the defendant by the plaintiff, then and there acting and doing business as such a combination, as aforesaid, in violation of the provisions of said act.
"Thirdly. That the plaintiff is and at all times since the 1st of January, 1893, was a trust doing business as such in the State of Illinois and elsewhere, contrary to the provisions of an act of the legislature of the State of Illinois entitled 'An act to define trusts and conspiracies against trade, declaring contracts in violation of this provision void, and making certain acts and violations thereof misdemeanors, and prescribing punishment thereof and matters connected therewith, approved June 20, 1893, in force July 1, 1893;' that this action is brought solely to recover the price of articles of merchandise, to wit, sewer and drainage pipes, sold to the defendant by the plaintiff, then and there acting and doing business in violation of the provisions of said act, and that the defendant hereby pleads said act in defence to this action and the whole thereof."
The set-offs claimed by Connolly were: Treble the amount of the actual damages sustained and allowed by the act of Congress of July 2, 1890, c. 647, known as the Sherman anti-trust act, $56,970.44; actual damages sustained by reason of the violation by the plaintiff of the provisions of the Illinois statute of July 1, 1893, $17,323.48; and for money had and received by plaintiff of defendant contrary to law, $17,323.48.
The set-offs claimed by Dee were of like character but of larger amounts.
Both cases were, by agreement, submitted to the same jury and were treated as one consolidated case. At the trial the defendants respectively asked leave to amend their notices of special defences, but leave was denied.
The Circuit Court disallowed both the first and second of the above special defences, and in respect of the third its decision was that the Illinois Trust statute of 1893 was in violation of the Constitution of the United States. It consequently directed the jury to find a verdict for the plaintiff in each case; in the Connolly case, for the amount of the two notes sued on; in the Dee case, for the amount of the plaintiff's open account against him. Verdicts having been returned as directed, and a motion for new trial in one case, and motions for new trial and in arrest of judgment in the other, having been overruled, judgments were entered on the verdicts.
1. The defendant in error insists that these cases should have gone to the Circuit Court of Appeals, and has moved on that ground that the writ of error be dismissed. The defence in each case was based in part on the Illinois statute of 1893. The plaintiff insisted at the trial that that statute was in violation of the Constitution of the United States, and its position was sustained by the Circuit Court. There have been suits in which the Circuit Court upon the claim of the defendant has applied the Constitution of the United States to the case before it and put the plaintiff out of court. Here, the plaintiff claimed that the state enactment upon which defendants relied was unconstitutional, and its position upon that point was sustained. In Loeb v. Columbia Township Trustees, 179 U.S. 472, 477, this court said: "The Circuit Court of Appeals Act does not declare that the final judgment of a Circuit Court in a case in which there was a claim of the repugnancy of a state statute to the Constitution of the United States may be reviewed here only upon writ of error sued out by the party making the claim. In other words, if a claim is made in the Circuit Court, no matter by which party, that a state enactment is invalid under the Constitution of the United States, and that claim is sustained or rejected, then it is consistent with the words of the act, and, we think, in harmony with its object, that this court
review the judgment at the instance of the unsuccessful party, whether plaintiff or defendant. It was the purpose of Congress to give opportunity to an unsuccessful litigant to come to this court directly from the Circuit Court in every case in which a claim is made that a state statute is in contravention of the Constitution of the United States." Upon the authority of that case, the motion to dismiss is denied.
2. The defendant Connolly purchased Akron sewer pipe from the plaintiff and for the agreed price thereof gave the two promissory notes upon which he was sued. The defendant Dee also purchased Akron sewer pipe at an agreed price as shown by the account upon which he was sued. Each defendant disputed his liability to the plaintiff upon the ground that prior to the making of the contracts with the defendants respectively for pipe, the plaintiff corporation entered into a combination with certain firms, corporations and companies engaged in Ohio in the manufacture of Akron pipe; which combination, it is alleged, was in illegal restraint of trade and therefore forbidden by the principles of the common law as recognized and enforced both in Ohio and Illinois.
The defence cannot be maintained. Assuming, as defendants contend, that the alleged combination was illegal if tested by the principles of the common law, still it would not follow that they could, at common law, refuse to pay for pipe bought by them under special contracts with the plaintiff. The illegality of such combination did not prevent the plaintiff corporation from selling pipe that it obtained from its constituent companies or either of them. It could pass a title by a sale to any one desiring to buy, and the buyer could not justify a refusal to pay for what he bought and received by proving that the seller had previously, in the prosecution of its business, entered into an illegal combination with others in reference generally to the sale of Akron pipe.
In Strait v. National Harrow Co., 51 Fed. Rep. 819, a suit in which the plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction restraining the defendant from instituting or prosecuting any action against the plaintiffs for the infringement of letters patent owned by the defendant covering certain improvements in spring-tooth harrows,
or from instituting or prosecuting any such suits against any person using the spring-tooth harrows manufactured by the plaintiffs, the court said: "In substance, the complaint shows that the defendant has entered into a combination with various other manufacturers of spring-tooth harrows for the purpose of acquiring a monopoly in this country in the manufacture and sale of the same, and, as an incident thereto, has acquired all the rights of the other manufacturers for the exclusive sale and manufacture of such harrows under patents, or interests in patents, owned by them respectively. Such a combination may be an odious and a wicked one, but the proposition that the plaintiffs, while infringing the rights vested in the defendant under letters patent of the United States, is entitled to stop the defendant from bringing or prosecuting any suit therefor because the defendant is an obnoxious corporation, and is seeking to perpetuate the monopoly which is conferred upon it by its title to the letters patent, is a novel one, and entirely unwarranted. The party having such a patent has a right to bring suit on it, not only against a manufacturer who infringes, but against dealers and users of the patented article, if he believes the patent is being infringed; and the motive which prompts him to sue is not open to judicial inquiry, because, having a legal right to sue, it is immaterial whether his motives are good or bad, and he is not required to give his reasons for the attempt to assert his legal rights. 'The exercise of the legal right cannot be affected by the motive which controls it.' Kiff v. Youmans, 86 N.Y. 329."
In National Distilling Co. v. Cream City Importing Co., 86 Wisconsin, 352, 355, which was an action to recover the price of goods sold and delivered, one of the defences was that the plaintiff was a member of an illegal trust or combination to interfere with the freedom of trade and commerce. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin said: "The first defence does not deny any allegation of the complaint, but the substance of it is that the sale and delivery of the goods in question to the defendant was void as against public policy, because the vendor was at the time a member of an unlawful trust or combination, formed to unlawfully interfere with the freedom of trade and commerce
and in restraint thereof and to accomplish the ends therein set forth. . . . Conceding, for the purposes of this case, that the trust or combination in question may be illegal and its members may be restrained from carrying out the purposes for which it was created by a court of equity in a suit on behalf of the public, or may be subject to indictment and punishment, there is, nevertheless, no allegation showing or tending to show that the contract of sale between the plaintiff and defendant was tainted with any illegality, or was contrary to public policy. The argument, if any the case admits of, is that, as the plaintiff was a member of the so-called 'trust,' or 'combination,' the defendant might voluntarily purchase the goods in question of it at any agreed price, and convert them to its own use, and be justified in a court of justice in its refusal to pay the plaintiff for them, because of the connection of the vendor with such trust or combination. The plaintiff's cause of action is in no legal sense dependent upon, or affected by the alleged illegality of the trust or combination, because the illegality, if any, is entirely collateral to the transaction in question, and the court is not called upon in this action to enforce any contract tainted with illegality, or contrary to public policy. The mere fact that the plaintiff is a member of a trust or combination, created with the intent and purposes set forth in the answer, will not disable or prevent it in law from selling goods within or affected by the provisions of such trust or combination, and recovering their price or value. It does not appear that it had stipulated to refrain from such transactions. A contrary doctrine would lead to most startling and dangerous consequences."
That case was cited with approval by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Dennehy v. McNulta, 86 Fed. Rep. 825, 827, 829. In that case the court said: "The mere fact that the corporation, as one of the contracting parties, may constitute an unjust monopoly, and that its general business is illegal -- a status apparently held in Distilling & Cattle Feeding Co. v. People, 156 Illinois, 448 -- cannot serve, ipso facto, to create default or liability on its contracts generally; nor can such fact be invoked collaterally to affect in any
manner its independent contract obligations." Again: "In the case of an injurious combination of the nature asserted here, the remedy is by well recognized and direct proceedings; but one who voluntarily and knowingly deals with the parties so combined cannot, on the one hand, take the benefit of his bargain, and, on the other, have a right of action against the seller for the money paid, or any part of it, either upon the ground that the combination is illegal, or that its prices were unreasonable."
It is undoubtedly the general rule that a contract made in violation of a statute is void, and no recovery can be had upon it; as in Embrey v. Johnson, 131 U.S. 336, 348. That was an action upon a promissory note given in execution of a contract for the purchase of "future delivery" cotton, neither the purchase or delivery of actual cotton being contemplated by the parties, but the settlement in respect to which was to be on the basis of the "difference" between the contract price and the market price of cotton futures, according to the fluctuations in the market. The contract was held to be a wagering contract, and therefore illegal and void. As there could be no recovery upon the original agreement without disclosing the fact that it was illegal and one that could not, for that reason, be enforced or made the basis of a judgment, it was held, that attention could not be withdrawn from the illegality of the contract by the device of taking notes for the amount claimed under that contract. So, in Miller v. Ammon, 145 U.S. 421, 427. That was an action to recover the value of 1125 gallons of wines sold in Chicago by one who had not obtained a license to sell liquors at all -- an ordinance of that city expressly declaring that no person, firm, or corporation should sell or offer for sale "any spirituous or vinous liquors in quantities of one gallon or more at a time, within the city, without having first obtained a license therefor," under a penalty of not less than $50 or more than $200 for each offence. It was held that the action could not be maintained, because "an act done in disobedience to the law creates no right of action which a court of justice will enforce." In that case the sale from which it was attempted to imply the promise of the buyer to pay for what
he received, was itself expressly forbidden by law under a penalty. The action there was upon the sale, and there was a direct connection between it and the purchase of the wines. So, again, in McMullen v. Hoffman, 174 U.S. 639, 654, after an extended review of the cases, American and English, the court said: "The authorities from the earliest time to the present unanimously held that no court will lend its assistance in any way toward carrying out the terms of an illegal contract."
In the present case other considerations must control. This is not an action to enforce or which involves the enforcement of the alleged arrangement or combination between the plaintiff corporation and other corporations, firms and companies in relation to the sale of Akron pipe. As already suggested, the plaintiff, even if part of a combination illegal at common law, was not for that reason forbidden to sell property it acquired or held for sale. The purchases by the defendants had no necessary or direct connection with the alleged illegal combination; for the contracts between the defendants and the plaintiff could have been proven without any reference to the arrangement whereby the latter became an illegal combination. If, according to the principles of the common law, the Union Sewer Pipe Company could not have sold or passed title to any pipe it received and held for sale, because of an illegal arrangement previously made with other corporations, firms or companies, a different question would be presented. But we are aware of no decision to the effect that a sale similar to that made by the present plaintiff to the defendants respectively would in itself be illegal or void under the principles of the common law. The contracts between the plaintiff and the respective defendants were, in every sense, collateral to the alleged agreement between the plaintiff and other corporations, firms or associations whereby an illegal combination was formed for the sale of sewer pipe.
We are of opinion that the first special defence, based alone upon the principles of the common law, was properly overruled.
3. The special defence based upon the act of Congress of July 2, 1890, c. 647, 26 Stat. 209, ...