ERROR TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KENTUCKY.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the court.
The plaintiff in error, the Citizens' Savings Bank of Owensboro, Kentucky, was created, by an act of the general assembly of the State of Kentucky, approved May 12, 1884, with authority to do a general banking business. The legislative charter provided that the corporation should exist for a period of thirty years from the date of the act, and in section 7 it was provided that on the first day of January in each year the bank should pay "into the state treasury, for the benefit of revenue proper, fifty cents on each one hundred dollars of stock held and paid for in said bank, which shall be in full of all tax and bonus thereon of every kind."
At the time this charter was granted there existed on the statute books of Kentucky a law, enacted February 14, 1856, 2 Rev. Stat. Ky. 121, providing as follows:
"SEC. 1. That all charters and grants of or to corporations, or amendments thereof, and all other statutes, shall be subject to amendment or repeal at the will of the legislature, unless a contrary intent be therein plainly expressed: Provided, That whilst privileges and franchises so granted may be changed or repealed, no amendment or repeal shall impair other rights previously vested.
"SEC. 3. That the provisions of this act shall only apply to charters and acts of incorporation to be granted hereafter; and that this act shall take effect from its passage."
It would seem that from the date of its creation until the year 1886 the bank was called upon to pay only the taxes provided in the seventh section of its charter. In 1886 (Session Acts of Kentucky, 1885-6, pp. 140, 144 to 147, 201) the legislature of Kentucky adopted what is designated in the
briefs of counsel as the Hewitt Act, containing the following provisions as to the taxation of banks:
"SEC. 1. That shares of stock in state and national banks, and other institutions of loan or discount, and in all corporations required by law to be taxed on their capital stock, shall be taxed 75 cents on each share thereof, equal to $100, or on each $100 of stock therein owned by individuals, corporations or societies, and said banks, institutions and corporations shall, in addition, pay upon each $100 of so much of their surplus, undivided surplus, undivided profits or undivided accumulations as exceeds an amount equal to 10 per cent of their capital stock, which shall be in full of all tax, state, county and municipal.
"SEC. 4. That each of said banks, institutions and corporations, by its corporate authority, with the consent of a majority in interest of a quorum of its stockholders, at a regular or called meeting thereof, may give its consent to the levying of said tax, and agree to pay the same as herein provided, and to waive and release all right under the act of Congress, or under the charters of the state banks, to a different mode or smaller rate of taxation, which consent or agreement to and with the State of Kentucky shall be evidenced by writing under the seal of such bank and delivered to the Governor of this Commonwealth; and upon such agreement and consent being delivered, and in consideration thereof, such bank and its shares of stock shall be exempt from all other taxation whatsoever so long as said tax shall be paid during the corporate existence of such banks.
"SEC. 5. The said bank may take the proceeding authorized by section 4 of this act at any time until the meeting of the next general assemply: Provided, They pay the tax provided in section 1 from the passage of this act.
"SEC. 6. This act shall be subject to the provisions of section eight (8), chapter sixty-eight (68), of the general statutes.
"SEC. 7. If any bank, state or national, shall fail or refuse to pay the tax imposed by this act, or shall fail or refuse to
make the consent and agreement as prescribed in section 4, the shares of stock of such bank, institution or corporation, and its surplus, undivided accumulations and undivided profits, shall be assessed as directed by section 2 of this act, and the taxes -- state, county and municipal -- shall be imposed, levied and collected upon the assessed shares, surplus, undivided profits, undivided accumulations, as is imposed on the assessed taxable property in the hands of individuals: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall be construed as exempting from taxation for county or municipal purposes any real estate or building owned and used by said banks or corporations for conducting their business, but the same may be taxed for county and municipal purposes as other real estate is taxed."
The Citizens' Savings Bank accepted the Hewitt Act in the mode provided, and thereafter paid the tax specified therein.
In 1891 Kentucky adopted a new constitution, which contained the following:
"SEC. 174. All property, whether owned by natural persons or corporations, shall be taxed in proportion to its value, unless exempted by this constitution; and all corporate property shall pay the same rate of taxation paid by individual property. Nothing in this constitution shall be construed to prevent the general assembly from providing for taxation based on income, licenses or franchises."
The State of Kentucky, in 1892, enacted a law providing, among other things, for the assessment and taxation by the State, counties and municipalities, of banking and other corporations. This law was in absolute conflict with the Hewitt Act, and by special provision as well as by necessary legal intendment operated, if the constitution had not already done so, to repeal the system of bank taxation established by the Hewitt Act. Without detailing the scheme of taxation created by the law of 1892, it suffices to say that it organized a State board whose duty it was to ascertain and fix the value of what was termed the franchises of banks and other corporations, referred to in the law, and upon the amount so fixed the general state tax was levied. It was besides made
the duty of the board to certify its valuation of the property or franchises to the proper county or municipality in which the corporation was located, so that the sum of this assessment might become the basis upon which the local taxes should be laid. The city of Owensboro, where the Citizens' Savings Bank was located, established by ordinances the rate of municipal taxes for the years 1893 and 1894, and the sum so fixed was assessed upon the valuation of the franchises or property of the bank which had been certified by the state board in claimed conformity to the statute of 1892. The bank refused to pay these taxes, and a levy was made by the tax collector upon some of its property, and garnishment process was also issued against several of its debtors. Thereupon this suit was commenced by a petition, on behalf of the bank, to enjoin the city of Owensboro and its tax collector from enforcing the taxes in question.
The averments of the petition, and of the amendments thereto -- for it was twice amended -- assailed the validity of the tax on several grounds, all of which are, substantially, included in the following summary:
First. That the board of state valuation had no power under the constitution and laws of the State to make an assessment for local taxation, and, if it had such power, had not exercised it lawfully, because the method of valuation pursued by it was so arbitrary as to cause its action to be void. Section. That no notice of the assessment had been given the officials, as required by the state law. Third. That the taxes violated the equality clause of the state constitution, because, by the method adopted in making the assessment, the property of the bank had been valued by a rule which caused it to be assessed at proportionately one third more than the sum assessed against other property in the city of Owensboro, and by one half more than the valuation at which the property of other taxpayers throughout the State was assessed. Fourth. That the taxes violated the state law and constitution, because based upon an assessment made by the state board, and not on an assessment made by the city, and that they were likewise illegal, because the levy of the tax predicated
upon the assessment, by the state board, was dehors the powers of the city of Owensboro under the state laws. Fifth. That the taxes moreover violated the equality clause of the state constitution, because as there were certain national banks doing business in the city of Owensboro, against whom the franchise tax provided by the state law could not be enforced, without a violation of the law of the United States, therefore these banks could not be taxed for the franchise tax, and not to tax them, whilst taxing the petitioner, would bring about inequality of taxation, and hence be a violation of the state constitution. Sixth. The taxes were expressly and particularly attacked on the ground that the Hewitt Act, and the acceptance of the terms thereof, constituted an irrevocable contract, between the State and the bank, exempting it from all taxation other than as specified in the Hewitt Act, and therefore that the revenue act of 1892 and the levy of the taxes in question by the city of Owensboro violated the contract rights of the bank, which were protected from impairment by the Constitution of the United States.
In further support of this ground the petition charged that at the time the Hewitt Act was passed the bank had an irrevocable contract arising from section 7 of its charter limiting taxation to the sum there specified, which right the bank had surrendered in consequence of the contract embodied in the Hewitt Act. It was averred that this surrender of its contract right to enjoy the limited taxation, conferred by its charter, was a valid consideration moving between the bank and the State, operating to cause the Hewitt Act to become a constract upon adequate consideration.
A preliminary injunction restraining the collection of the taxes was allowed. The city of Owensboro demurred to the petition and to the various amendments thereof, and, reserving its demurrers, answered traversing the averments of the original petition and the amendments thereto. Motions were made to dissolve the injunction. On these motions testimony was taken and the case was heard on the motions to dissolve, and on the demurrers. The trial court dissolved the injunction, sustained the demurrers, and dismissed the suit. On appeal to
the Court of Appeals of Kentucky the decree of the trial court was ...